some time before the study period in response to a postoperative renal failure rate which had previously been as high as 8%.
Cardiac arrest group
All patients who suffered a cardiac arrest had ECG monitoring at the time. A slight trend towards the increased use of both lAP and CVP monitoring was evident in this group, suggesting that potential haemodynamic instability may have been increasingly recognised in this group over the study period. There appear to have been only two other recent major studies of intraoperative cardiac arrests,6.7 neither of which analysed the monitors in use before the arrest. Documentation ofthe details of the role played by monitors prior to and after a cardiac arrest would seem to be a worthwhile way of assessing the relative value of different monitoring devices in the diagnosis and management of cardiac arrests.
The main point to emerge from the discussion was the great variation in both surgical and anaesthetic practice across Australia. For example, between 1984 and 1986 some hospitals had no oxygen analysers but always used disconnect alarms, some had oxygen analysers but no disconnect alarms, some had both, and some had neither. This variability reflects the difficulties facing anaesthetists in deciding what monitors are needed.
It was recognised that the study would have been enhanced if all clinical as well as equipment-based monitoring had been documented in detail. Also, it was recognised that it would have been useful if the frequency with which the use of different monitors had led to the detection of problems had been documented. These and other points are being addressed in a multi-centre anaesthesia incident reporting study, plans for which are discussed in the last article in this issue.
Two aspects of monitoring patients during anaesthesia in private hospitals will be addressed.
The first is what monitoring may be considered necessary, and the second relates to the provision and maintenance of adequate equipment for monitoring. The views expressed are based on experience in the private (and public) hospitals of Adelaide during the past two decades. Although the discussion relates particularly to South Australia, the overall problems and recommendations are of general relevance to the Australasian region.
There are about 120 hospitals in South Australia of which about 75 are country hospitals and 30 are metropolitan private hospitals. Of the country hospitals only three have over 100 beds. The country hospitals are recognised government hospitals in which some private work is done. Of the private hospitals six have between 100 and 200 beds. The total number of metropolitan beds is 5,600 and of these 3,100 are in major teaching hospitals and 1,880 are in private hospitals. As 74% of private hospital admissions are surgical, it means that nearly half the metropolitan surgical beds are in private hospitals.
It should be obvious that monitoring requirements in private anaesthetic practice are the same as those for anaesthesia anywhere for the same clinical situation. In some smaller hospitals, the range of surgery is less, and monitoring requirements more modest.
In one 200-bed private hospital, although no cardiac, thoracic or neurosurgical procedures are undertaken, major vascular surgery does take place and in some other private hospitals thoracic and neurosurgery are performed. The monitoring requirements in these hospitals are similar to those in large teaching hospitals. However, in a hospital in which only general surgery, orthopaedics, gynaecology, ENT and eye surgery are performed, some of the invasive monitoring techniques are unnecessary.
The provision and maintenance of monitoring equipment for anaesthesia has much in common with the provision of anaesthetic facilities as a whole, except that where anaesthetic equipment is not present the case cannot be performed, whereas without monitoring equipment the anaesthetic and surgery can be carried out albeit with a smaller margin of patient safety.
In teaching hospitals the provision of all equipment, drugs and facilities has always been the responsibility of the hospital, while in private hospitals this has often not been so. In spite of the policy of the Australian Society of Anaesthetists (ASA), in many areas anaesthetists still provide at least some of what is required. Nevertheless, in principle it is the hospital's responsibility to ensure that the equipment necessary for optimal patient care is available.
The problems of providing facilities for anaesthesia in private hospitals in Adelaide parallel those of providing monitoring equipment. In the early 1960s, an anaesthetist carried his own bag, portable anaesthetic machine, and possibly, ventilator and monitor. One was able to ensure that the equipment was of one's own preference and was kept in proper order. However, the obvious problems of transporting equipment led the South Australian Branch of the ASA to seek changes to the system. The ASA invited each hospital to nominate an anaesthetist to be their 'Liaison Officer' and to act as a go-between from the ASA to the hospital for advice on the provision of equipment, servicing and other anaesthetic problems. In 1970 the author was appointed co-ordinator of these Liaison Officers.
Advice private hospitals, the Repatriation Hospital and one of the teaching hospitals participated.
Over the next decade the hospitals all obtained standard Boyles machines, vaporisers, ventilators and pulse and ECG monitors. At the same time recovery wards were established where few had previously existed, and were equipped in a standard fashion, while the recovery ward staff received centralised teaching.
These changes were all directed by the ASA through the medium of advice to the hospitals and there was surprisingly good co-operation by the hospitals, although very occasionally it was necessary to draw attention to the medico-legal implications if advice from the ASA was not accepted.
One of the important philosophies which the ASA had during this period was to standardise important equipment in theatres through which a number of anaesthestists would rotate over a short time, so that these anaesthetists would be familiar with the anaesthetic machines and ventilators. This was considered to be equally important whether the operating theatre was one of many at a large hospital or one of a number of private hospital theatres scattered around the city, and similarly whether the anaesthetists were rotating registrars or visiting or part-time consultants. Emergency theatres where anaesthetists may be expected to perform at short notice were considered to be particularly important.
Recently pressures on hospitals have led to a departmentalisation of even small private institutions to fulfil requirements for accreditation. Unfortunately many hospitals appointed anaesthetists-in-charge who were not ASA Liaison Officers, and equipment has been purchased without reference to the ASA. Centralised teaching of recovery staff has disappeared as hospitals have felt that they must conduct their own 'in service' education. Equipment has been provided which has been the choice of individual anaesthetists rather than the collective preference of anaesthetists as a whole.
In the private sector at the moment the hospitals are keen to provide a good standard and there seem to be funds available, but guidance is necessary so that these funds are used to the best advantage.
In conclusion, monitoring in private hospitals, and the problems of patient safety, are no different from those in public hospitals and in both have to be related to the nature of the work being undertaken. In demanding essential monitoring we must be careful not to let our individual enthusiasm for particular monitors dictate a standard which to many of our colleagues would be discretionary. There may be a place for individual anaesthetists acquiring specific monitors for their own use either personally or by arrangement with departmental funding.
Although there are considerable regional differences throughout Australia and New Zealand, moves towards some measure of standardisation
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Key Words: ANAESTHESIA: crisis management, cardiac arrest, anaphylaxis, cardiopulmonary resuscitation All anaesthetists have to deal with crises of varying degrees of severity. At best, a crisis manifests itself as an unforeseeable problem which is immediately recognised and appropriately dealt with, without morbidity or death resulting. An example would be an anaphylactic reaction to an induction agent which was immediately recognised and appropriately and successfully managed. Such immediately recognised and appropriately managed crises may still, of course, result in the death ofthe patient -an 'inevitable' or 'blameless' death.
A more disturbing crisis is one in which the anaesthetist suddenly becomes aware that something is drastically wrong, but the cause is not apparent. For example, it is suddenly noticed that the patient has become cyanosed and bradycardic for no apparent reason. This is a far more difficult situation as there are many potential causes. If, for example, this occurs immediately after induction of anaesthesia, and, in spite of all appropriate measures, the patient proves refractory to resuscitation, it is a most distressing situation for all concerned. Many assume that something was missed or that resuscitation was inadequate. In one such case the patient proved at autopsy to have had a massive pulmonary embolus following her leg being raised for a calf-stimulator to be appliedanother 'blameless' death or misadventure.
An even more worrying crisis is one in which problems have arisen for reasons the anaesthetist suddenly realises were preventable, or were caused by a thoughtless action on his or her part. An example would be when a large dose of thiopentone has slowly but progressively been given to a frail elderly patient, while commenting to observers that the patient must have an acquired tolerance to anaesthetic drugs, only to realise that the sphygmomanometer cuff on that arm had inappropriately been left inflated after placement of the needle, and has now been deflated, leaving the patient grey and pulseless. A planned, organised approach is necessary in these situations ( Table I) . As there are up to thirty clinical monitoring tasks for the anaesthetist and over thirty parameters which may be monitored by machines during anaesthesia, I a crisis is not the time to start a systematic but sequentially inappropriate search for a possible cause.
TABLE 1
Crisis management I. The first thing is to accept that crises will occur and that on some occasions we may have contributed to them. As stated by Allnutt: 'An absolutely basic tenet of this paper is that all human beings, without any exception whatsoever, make errors and that such errors are a completely normal and necessary part of human cognitive function. For a pilot or doctor to accept that he or she is as likely as anyone else to make a catastrophic error today is the first step towards prevention; whereas to claim exemption on the grounds of being a test pilot, senior professor, commanding officer or consultant, or of having thirty years' experience or 3000 accident-free hours, is the first step on the road to disaster. '2 
